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21. Introduction.
 
In the traditions of phenomenological psychiatry it is not seldom stated
that melancholia and mania involve some disturbance of time
consciousness. For example, T. Fuchs has recently argued that
melancholics suffer from a "desynchronization" of personal and
collective time.1 This poster discusses from an analytical-philosophical
point of view what the French psychiatrist Henri Ey says about time
consciousness in mania and melancholia, concentrating on the question,
"Which concept of 'consciousness' is implied by his position?".
  Henri Ey (1900-1977) was and is a very influential figure in
French psychiatry.2 He wrote important textbooks in clinical
psychiatry3 and several theoretical works where he advanced his
"organo-dynamic" view of the mind-brain. His magnus opus is the two-
volume treatise about hallucinations that was published four years
before his death.4 Ey was also very well versed in contemporary
philosophical thought and made interesting contributions to the
philosophy of mind, especially in La Conscience (1963)5, the second
edition of which was translated to English in 1978 as
Consciousness.6 The present poster draws heavily on the formulations in
Consciousness.
 Among psychiatric disturbances of consciousness, Ey
distinguishes between destructurations of the field of consciousness
(approximately = breakdowns of the organisation of the perceptual field)
and alterations/alienations of the self. To the former category belong
(among others) dreaming, confusional states, hallucinations and
disturbances of the body image, but also melancholia and mania. The
latter are said to be "destructurations" at the highest organisational level
of the field of consciousness and to essentially involve a pathology of
time consciousness. To quote just a few formulations, melancholia is
"the pathetic immobility of a time which is suspended from the
irreversibility of the past mistake, the syncope of a time which can no
longer flow, from which any movement of hope has been
abolished".7 For the manic, on the other hand, "the future is there, as if
all possibilities were equally possible"; manic experience "refuses to
pause".8
32. Brands of consciousness
Analytical philosophers tend to distinguish between two main uses of
the term "conscious" and its derivatives, or as one might also express it,
two concepts of consciousness.
Here we must pause to consider a few linguistic facts. The
French term conscience covers not only consciousness in the ordinary
sense(s) of the English word, but also the English conscience. Looking
at two other major European languages, German and Swedish, both have
two words here: Bewusstsein/Gewissen and medvetande/samvete. Again,
the German and Swedish terms Bewusstsein and medvetande,
respectively, have not one but two counterparts in English,
consciousness and awareness. For these lingustic reasons it can be quite
difficult to transfer a semantical discussion about consciousness from
one European language to another. But these difficulties can be
overcome if one considers that the point of making a conceptual
distinction is not to produce lexical definitions of terms, but to
distinguish between different concepts, which in turn delimit related but
distinct phenomena. In this spirit, what I am saying next should be taken
as an attempt to clarify a certain cluster of concepts which in English
usage happen to be attached more or less loosely to terms such as
"conscious", "consciously", "awareness" and so on.
The first concept of consciousness, then, is the purely cognitive
one in which consciousness of a fact is the same as knowledge of that
fact. In English, it is common to use "aware" in this cognitive sense.
Cognitive consciousness need not involve having any actual thoughts or,
indeed, any experiences at all. You may for example say about a person
who is deep asleep and has not set the alarm, "She is well aware of the
fact that she has to get up at 7 o'clock, and she always awakens in time
without a clock". The other use is the experiential one where being
conscious does imply having a phenomenal experience of some kind.
Hearing a loud sound and seeing a  beautiful landscape involves
experiential consciousness of the auditory and visual kind, respectively.
43. Time and the body schema
However, neither of these uses of  "consciousness" seems to capture
what Ey and other phenomenological psychiatrists intend when they
argue that, e.g., melancholia involves a disturbance of time
consciousness. What they describe in their patients is not any lacking
knowledge of temporal relations, neither a pathological experience of
time – at least not only such an experience. Pathological experiences of
time (e.g., a feeling that time runs very slowly) are found in neurological
conditions, but the essential disturbance of  "time consciousness" in a
melancholic patient seems rather to involve the subject's intentions to
act – she dwells in past actions (especially, of course, in her failures and
missed opportunities) and does not invest her energy in the present
situation, the possibilities of which she cannot see. In what sense is this
a disturbance of consciousness?
To answer this question, I will first try to clarify briefly the
temporal aspects of the "body schema" as defined by Henry Head and
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Surprisingly, although The Phenomenology of
Perception9 contains long sections both about the body schema and
about temporality, Merleau-Ponty does not discuss their interrelations at
length. However, it should be obvious that typical manifestations of the
body schema such as the ability to catch an approaching ball, or to
coordinate hand and eye in exploring an object, or to play violin in a
quartet, involve a mastery of time to the same extent as they involve a
mastery of space. If you don't know exactly when the C sharp is to be
played, it does not help much that you know exactly where to place your
finger to produce it. Moreover, for an experienced violinist these items
are obviously both matters of practical knowledge, and hence of the
body schema. So, if there is a primordial space which is accessed by
means of the body schema, there is also a primordial time in which this
space is accessed. Or better, the body schema typically unfolds in
primordial space-time.
54. Control consciousness
The manifestations of the body schema are partly unconscious and
automatic (for example, in most of our regulation of bodily posture) but
partly conscious, such as in quartet playing or when trying to keep the
upright posture when balancing over a field of large stones. Well, in
which sense is consciousness involved in the latter case? Obviously we
are not here referring to consciousness in the cognitive sense. It is
perhaps less obvious that we are not talking about experiential
conscious-ness, since some experiences are usually involved in the two
activities I have given as examples. But when balancing over a field of
stones, we are not only having conscious experiences of ourselves
balancing, we balance consciously. And while playing the violin, the
violinist normally does not only have experiences of herself performing
a piece of music (that would rather be characteristic of a state of
depersonalization), but consciously performs it.
I suggest that in addition to cognitive and experiential
("phenomenal") consciousness, we should distinguish a third kind,
namely control consciousness. Control consciousness is the mind's way
of controlling and steering actions on a level above reflexes and
automatisms. Here I would really have liked to continue in Swedish
since there are many good examples of Swedish phrases referring to
control consciousness, for example "Jag gjorde det inte medvetet"
(meaning I did not do it intentionally) and "Det var inte en tillfällighet,
utan ett medvetet val av mig" (It was no accident, but a deliberate
choice on my part). In ordinary English language there may be fewer
such uses, but I think that control consciousness is referenced when we
say "I drove the car all the way home without being aware of it". To be
sure, you had experiences of driving all the way home (since you were
not unconscious), and surely, you knew that you were on your way
home; but you did not consciously control the driving (since your
driving automatisms were sufficiently well developed to be allowed to
take over).
65. An excursus on Husserl
I would like to argue that Husserl's famous analyses of internal time
consciousness10 are incomplete at best, because he never pays enough
attention to the control aspect of consciousness. The complicated
structure of "retentions" (referring to the immediate past) and
"protentions" (antecipating the immediate future) which Husserl
postulates is just not plausible if interpreted only as an experiential
structure. If every present impression had to be accompanied by a
retentional experience not only of past impressions, but also of past
retentional experiences as Husserl's theory would demand, the theatre of
experiential consciousness would tend to become overcrowded very
soon.11  Also, one may seriously doubt that there is a protentional
experience corresponding to each short-term expectation that one can be
said to have. I would rather say that as a rule, short-term expectations
are not represented in experience at all. The fact that frustrated
expectations tend to lead to lively experiences is quite another matter. At
least very often, the consciousness underlying such episodes is control
consciousness – we try to control the course of events, and the
experience of frustrated expectation occurs when the attempt fails (we
tried to thread on a step which turned out not to exist).
Should Husserl's analysis then be re-interpreted as saying that
there is a cognitive structure of retentions and protentions – i.e., as a
theory to the effect that we at each moment know what we experienced a
short while ago (and, more vaguely, what is going to happen)? No, since
that would be more like a rehearsal of what needs explaining rather than
an explanation of anything. My suggestion is instead that the concept of
control consciousness is of essential importance if we are going to
understand Husserl's theory of internal time consciousness in a way
which makes it at least somewhat plausible.
Now, the relevance of control consciousness to the analysis of
protentions is rather obvious: our apprehension of what is to come is
often tightly coupled to our actions and thereby to control consciousness
(and to the body schema). But what about retentions?
76. What memory is not for
To say that control consciousness is essentially involved in our
apprehension of the past may seem quite paradoxical. Of course we
cannot consciously control the past! Hence memory as a mental function
(or set of mental functions) seems to be independent of action.
However, if we consider the biological significance of memory, its
point is certainly not to allow us to look into the past, but to help us
control the future. This fact is also manifest in the way our perceptual
field is structured while we perform an action. If, for example, you
stretch out and bend your arm in an attempt to catch a snake which has
just hidden behind a stone (don’t do that!), the success of your action is
wholly dependent on the fact that in some sense, you rememember
seeing the snake vanishing behind the stone. But this "retentional"
component of your perception is not realized in the form of a memory
image of where the snake was a second ago, but in the form of a
perception of the snake as being behind the stone now – or rather, as
being there in the immediate future, since that is when your hand is
going to be there. In the same way, the violinist’s practical knowledge of
which note to play next, and when, is surely based on her short-term
memory; but what she hears with her mind’s ear is normally the next
note to be played, not the previous ones. In short, retentions are
normally translated immediately into protentions which underly and
guide our actions. That’s how the body schema unfolds in space-time.
But surely we do often remember things in the sense that we have
conscious memory acts directed towards the past? Yes, of course, but I
would argue that memory in this sense does not exist because Nature has
benevolently given us the opportunity to enjoy mental slideshows of the
past. Instead, it is because the primary mechanism sketched above does
not always suffice for controlling the future. If an action plan fails at the
level of primordial perception, we take recourse to more advanced
mental operations which typically involve rehearsals of longer actions
sequences – maybe going all the way back to where things started (why
am I trying to catch snakes?).
87. Is consciousness of time disturbed in melancholia and
mania?
In another context I have introduced the term "practical perception" for
perceptions which lead to practical knowledge of what has to be done,
and which thereby involves the body schema.12 What I have been saying
in this poster is that not only is practical perception essentially forward-
looking; it also constitutes the most fundamental form of time
consciousness on which all other forms depend. I think that in a very
general way, this fact (if it is a fact) may make it more comprehensible
that melancholia and mania could be said to involve disturbances of
time consciousness. Maybe the psychomotor inhibition of depression
and the disinhibition of mania could be described as certain kinds of
fault in that organisation of the perceptual field which makes it possible
for us to see what can and should be done? Isn’t melancholia the
inability to see what can be done, and mania the inability to see what
should not be done? I am here talking about seeing in a literal sense, not
about seeing in some loose sense of "knowing" or "understanding": if
Ey’s hypothesis is correct, bipolar affective disorder is a disorder of (the
field of) perception, not (or at least not primarily) of cognition.
To fully understand and evaluate Ey’s thesis about the nature of time
consciousness in melancholia and mania, one will have to go deeper into
what he says about the constitution of time consciousness in general.
Specifically, one should look closely into his view that what
philosophers (after William James) use to call "the specious present",
and which they sometimes call "the experienced Now", presupposes a
kind of spatialization of time which, moreover, is necessary if we are to
be able to perceive the Now as extended and thereby to exert our
capabilities of control consciousness at the level of basic practical
perception.13 If Ey is correct on this point (and I tend to think that he is),
he has contributed not only to our psychiatric understanding of the
affective disorders but also to the philosophical understanding of that
central enigma of consciousness, how perception of change is possible.
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